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HI. REFERENCES AND CITATIONS
References and citations in this brief shall have the following abbreviations:
The record of court* s file on appeal - AR (Appellate Record)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - URCP, and
Utah Code Annotated- UCA
Exhibits —Ex
Citations to the record will be (AR

)

IV. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Wardley Corporation, hereinafter "Wardley", argues that Young is bound by the Agency
Agreement1 which she entered into with it. Indeed, also is Wardley, and Wardley is bound by the
statute and laws of the State regulating the conduct of real estate brokers, as well as the case law of
Utah construing those statutes. The Real Estate Code2 provides that real estate agents cannot
maintain a suit in the Utah courts to recover their commission except against the principal broker with
whom they are licensed to engage in the business. In this case, appellant, Cindy Young, hereinafter
"Young," was entirely dependant upon Wardley to collect her earned real estate commission. This
placed upon Wardley a heightened duty of agency and afiduciaryduty to use all diligence to
safeguard and collect Young* s earned real estate commission for the sale of the Chateau Brickyard
Retirement Apartments, hereinafter "Chateau" or "Brickyard". For this reason the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah held that a real estate agency agreement between a broker and a real estate agent
was in actuality an employment agreement. Contrary to the summary judgement of the trial court,
this raises a substantial dispute as to an issue of material fact as to whether Wardley did all that it

1

The Agency Agreement is titled Broker-Sales Executive Contract Independent
Contractor Agreement.
2

§ 61-2-18

reasonably could have done to discharge this duty to Young which precluded the granting of
summary judgment.
Further, as construed by the Court, the Agency/Employment Agreement is ambiguous, which
requires the taking of extrinsic evidence to determine 1) whether it is ambiguous and 2) if so, the
intention of the parties at the time of entering into the Agreement.
ARGUMENT
A. POINTS REGARDING APPELLEE'S FACT STATEMENT
Appellee sets forth a number of fact statements from the Agency/Employment Agreement
between Young and Wardley that are incorrect or are largely irrelevant and are not applicable to the
facts of this case.
1.

Chief among these are extractions of statementsfromparagraph 9 of the Agreement,

which is not applicable at all to the Young v. Wardley issues. Paragraph 9 of the Employment
Agreement applies specifically to disputes between two or more agents who have overlapping or
conflicting claims to commissions and not to whether or not Wardley failed to pay them a commission
at all. The statement that, "In no case shall Wardley be liable to sales executive (agent) for any
commission..." is taken out of contextfromthat paragraph and does not apply to the facts of this case
at all. Wardley has already made this same argument below regarding paragraph 9. The trial court
ruled that paragraph 9 was not applicable to Young's case and based it's ruling on paragraph 8 of the
Agreement. Wardley has not appealed that ruling.
2.

In Wardley's fact statement paragraph 2(d) Wardley quotes out of context part of

paragraph 16 of the Agreement. Paragraph 16 merely provides that should an agent terminate his or
her relationship as an agent with Wardley the agent shall not be entitled to any commission unless the
2

transaction has closed and the commission is paid to Wardley before the termination of the agent.
In other words, that paragraph waives any obligation on the part of Wardley to pay commissions for
services rendered by the agent if the transaction does not close and the seller does not pay the
commission before the termination date of the agent. That provision is wholly inapplicable to the
issues in this appeal. The sale of the Chateau closed in July 1996 and Young* s agency relationship
with Wardley was not terminated until 1999. (AR 1396, p.529)
3.

Wardley states as a matter of fact in its fact statement no. 3 that Wardley paid Young

80 % of each commission. Wardley cites Young* s Amended Complaint which alleges that at times
material to the complaint Young was entitled to receive an 80% share of the commissions paid and
was paid 80% of some commissions. The entire tenor and allegations of the Amended Complaint
make it clear that Wardley did not pay Young 80% of the commissions paid on the Chateau
transaction. That was the subject of the trial below wherein the jury awarded Young $46,000.00.
(AR 1198-1200) Wardley initiallyfiledan appeal of that verdict and judgment but later dropped the
appeal. (AR 1292-1294: Record of case on appeal)
4.

Wardley admits in its fact statement no. 7 that young protested the unilateral reduction

of the real estate commission at closing, but states that she did nothing more to protect herself or
Wardley by preventing the escrow agentfrompaying the unpaid portion of commissions to the seller
and the buyer. Young did instruct the escrow agent not to disburse the unpaid portion, but did not
have authority to compel the escrow agent not to. (AR 312-313, Young's affidavit in opposition to
Wardley* s summary judgment motion) Only Wardley through one of its officers could make that
demand. Furthermore, details of the closing had little relevance at trial because of the issuance of
summary judgment. The issue at trial was whether Wardley had paid Young her share of the

3

commissions it did receive at the time of closing ($ 150,000). The evidence at trial was that it had not,
and the jvffy brought back a special verdict awarding $46,000 to Young. (AR 1223-1224)
5,

Wardley states in its fact statement no. 9 that Young provided no expert testimony to

support her claim that Wardley's efforts to collect the commission shortfall was unreasonable or
otherwise deficient. In her affidavit, Young provided testimony that she did consult attorneys about
what could and should be done to collect the unpaid commission. (AR 313-316) She also submitted
as exhibits to her affidavit in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, letters from
Wardley* s own attorneys, John Mangum of the lawfirmof Nielsen & Senior and Dan Anderson of
the lawfirmof Fabian Clendennen, opining that Wardley had an action against the escrow agent and
the buyer, as well as the seller. (AR 371-376: 382-387)
B.

WARDLEY IS BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT IT SIGNED
AND YOUNG IS ENTITLED TO HAVE IT ENFORCED ACCORDING
TO THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES AT THE TIME OF SIGNING.
Young does not quarrel with the law as stated by Wardley in its brief relative to contract

construction as far as it goes. "The underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is to
ascertain the intentions of the parties to the contract/5 WebBankv. American General Annuity Serv.
Corp., 54 P.3d 1139,1144,454 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (Utah 2002) citing Peterson v. Coca-Cola, 2002
UT42, f 9, 48P.3d941: and SAdE Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assoc. Inc.,
2001 UT 5e4, f 14, 28 P. 3d 669. " 'In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are
controlling.>w (Id ) (quoting Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, 957 P.3d 48) (Other citations
omitted)
The courts look to the language of the writing itself to ascertain the parities' intentions and
consider each contract provision in relation to all of the others, with a view to giving effect, "Ho all
4

and ignoring none."* (Id) (citations and quotations omitted) Normally, if the language is clear and
unambiguous a contract is construed by the language within the four corners of the contract.
However, if there is any ambiguity in its terms, the trial court must take extrinsic evidence to
determine whether or not it is ambiguous and if so to determine the intention of the parties at the time
they entered into the contract. (Id.); Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 907 P.2d 264
(1995) and Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah 1998). Whether the contract is ambiguous
is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. (Id)

A contract is ambiguous if it may be

subject to two or more plausible or reasonable interpretations because of "uncertain meanings of
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies/* (Id); WebBank, 54 P.3d @ 1145, ^ 20. The Utah
Supreme Court has also, "extended the ambiguity in contracts to include instances where despite the
lack of ambiguity in the terms and provisions of the contract themselves, an ambiguity exits as to the
nature and character of the contract or transaction as a whole/* (Id 1f 21)
Wardley argues that there are at least four provisions that "confirm the parties' intent that
Young's receipt of her net commission was dependent upon Wardley's receipt of the gross
commission proceedsfromthe underlying transaction." Wardley seizes upon the use of the word
or expression "received" in those four provisions to argue the Employment Agreement clearly
indicates that Wardley intended and is only required to pay Young a commission on the amount of
the money it received as commissionfromthe seller. This passive position is precisely the course of
conduct that Wardley undertook. Wardley merely sat back at the time of the closing of the Chateau
and allowed the seller to pay what it wanted to pay as a commission without taking any steps to
protect and secure the full amount that the seller contracted to pay in the Listing Agreement.
Contrary to the contention ofWardley, the Agreement between it and Young is not clear that
5

the payment of Young's earned commission for both the purchase and the sale of the Chateau is
dependent solely upon the amount that it receivedfromthe seller at closing. First of all, there is no
provision in the Agreement that states specifically and plainly that Young would not be paid a
commission if it were not collected or received by Wardley. There is not an express provision that
requires Young to waive her commission if the commission is not collectedfromthe seller because
of Wardley's inaction or reluctance to take steps necessary to protect all the earned commissions at
closing, or to exhaust legal means to obtain the commissionfromculpable parties after the closing.
There is no express provision in the Agreement that Wardley can arbitrarily waive or compromise
Young's commission, hi Reed v. Union Cent Life Ins., 61 P. 21(Utah 1900); andih the Matter of
the Estate ofAlmon J. Flake, 71 P3d 589 (Utah 2003), the Court held that "a waiver is an intentional
relinquishment of a known right." Waiver also requires a specific intention to relinquish it.
Furthermore, "The court will not rewrite a contract to supply terms which the parties omitted." Hal
Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica, Inc. 657 P.2d 743,749 (Utah 1982) Courts are not obligated rewrite
contracts to relieve one partyfroma bargain later regretted. Webb v. R O.A. General, Inc., 804 P.2d
547, 541 (Utah App. 1991).
A close examination of each of the terms or provisions of the Agreement indicate the use
of the words "received" and "collected" are only employed in the context of explaining how or when
the commissions under differing conditions were to be apportioned between agents and between
agents and Wardley as the broker. There is nothing in those provisions of the Agreement that states
directly that the agent is only entitled to be paid the commissions only if, only when, or not until they

6

are received (in other words, collected) by Wardley.3
The use of the word "received** in the "In-House Commission** provision on page 4 of the
Agreement uses the word and expression "received** or "collected** in the context of explaining how
and when the commissions are to be apportioned and paid out to the respective agent(s).
Wardley argues that paragraph 8 of the Agreement provides that Young will receive her
commission based only upon the amount 'collected** by Wardley. However, the use of the word and
expression "collection** in that provision is clearly and plainly for the purpose of providing when the
commission will be paid and not for limiting the amount of the commission paid or to be paid. It is
plain that the provision protects the agentfromunnecessary delays by the broker in paying the agent
their commissions. Contrary to Wardley* s argument that the word "collection** limits the commission
to the amount collected, that same provision expresses the commission in terms ofthe "[D]ivsion and
distribution of "earned commissions.** Young* s "earned commission** was determined by the
percentage of commission provided in the Listing Agreement between Wardley and the seller, which
is her share of the four percent of the sales price of $7,900,000.00, which amounts to a total
commission of $316,000.00.
Wardley accuses Young of arguing in her brief the provision concerning "distribution of
earned commissions** of paragraph 8 in isolation from the other provisions and terms of the
Agreement. Paragraph 8, while not expressed in the clearest terms, is plainly the Agreement* s
primary provision providing for the division and distribution of commissions ("earned commissions.**)
It is not expressed or incorporated obliquely by reference into the main body of the signed

3

The treatment of this issue is more thoroughly discussed in appellanfs opening appeal
brief pp. 13-17.
7

Agreement It is a primary provision of the Agreement
WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, If 18, 54 P.3d 1139, 1144
(Utah 2002) and PlateauMining Co. V. State Division of Lands, 802 P.2d 720,725 (Utah 1990) are
not to the contrary. In fact, the Supreme Court reversed the trial courts grant of summary judgment
in the WebBank case and remanded it to the trial court with specific instructions to determine the
parties' intentions as to whether the lump sum payment by WebBank in return for an assignment of
future payments under the structured settlement agreement with American General was in fact a
secured loan or was a sale and an assignment of the remaining future payments and in violation of the
structured settlement agreement with American General. And this notwithstanding, there was no
apparent ambiguity from the face of the documents, promissory note and the security agreement
prepared by Webbank and signed by the beneficiary of the structured settlement.

The Court

concluded that, u[D]espite the absence of ambiguity in the contract language and provisions
themselves, we conclude that an ambiguity exists as to the nature or character of the transactions as
a whole and [B]ecause summary judgment was improper due to the existence of a disputed factual
issue as to WebBank and Soliz' s intentions and the nature and character ofthe transaction we reverse
and remand for trial in order that extrinsic evidence may be presented as to the WebBank's and
Soliz's intentions regarding the nature and character of the transaction, notwithstanding there was
no apparent ambiguityfromthe documents.
Young agrees that the terms and provisions of the Agreement must be read together. The
oblique references to 'received' commissions cannot be read in isolation and without the provision
in paragraph 8 concerning the division and distribution of "earned commissions." Nor can the
entitlement to commissions be construed in isolationfromthe amount of the commission which the
8

seller, Chateau, agreed to pay in the Listing Agreement between it and Wardley. The terms and
provisions must be given their natural meaning in the context of the provision in which they are
contained. They should not be given some strained meaning which means something other than their
purpose and use in each respective provision and paragraph.
Wardley stretches beyond limits the construction ofthe Agreement when it attempts to argue
that paragraph 9 provides that "in no case" is Young entitled to any commission until it is collected,
and announces in triumphant tones that paragraph 9 fortifies that "Wardley* s actual receipt of the
gross commissionfromthe seller is the sine qua non of its duty to pay Young's net commission."4
Paragraph 9 applies only to disputed commissions between agents who make overlapping claims to
commissions. The paragraph provides that Wardley will hold the commissions due to the agents
(sales executives) until the portions are mutually agreed upon by the agents or determined by
arbitration and then pay them to the agents out of the agents' portion of the total commissions)
when it is collected. It provides that in no case shall Wardley be obligated to pay the agents any of
the disputed commissions which are to come out of their share of the commissions. That language
is distinctively differentfromthe fact and issues between Wardley and Young in this case. In this case
the dispute is between the broker, Wardley, and Young as agent, which is controlled by the provisions
of paragraph 8 of the Agreement.
C

CONTRARY TO WARDLEY'S CONTENTION, CASE AUTHORITIES
ARE ON POINT AND APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUE.

In absence of any specific primary or other provision that clearly states an agent (Young) may
4

Wardley made the same argument with regard to paragraph 9 below (AR 755, 758) and
the trial court rejected paragraph 9 as having any relevance to the issue before the Court. The
Honorable Judge based her decision on paragraph 8 and on the " In House Commission"
provision on page 4 of the Agreement. ( AR 800-801)
9

only be paid a commission if Wardley happens to collect it, Wardley has seized upon the various
provisions of the Agreement explaining when and how the commissions will be distributed and
ignores or misconstrues the provision in paragraph 8 concerning the division and distribution of
"earned commissions" to fashion its argument that it owes Young no commission that it does not
collect. It ascribes to itself to be the sole judge under the Agreement as to what action it will take
to collect the commission.
As construed by Wardley and the trial court below, the Agreement is ambiguous and extrinsic
evidence of the circumstances surrounding the entering into the Agreement must be taken to
determine if it is ambiguous. Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association^!

P.2d 264. If the

Agreement is ambiguous, if it is subject to two or more plausible interpretations, extrinsic evidence
must be taken to determine the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the Agreement..
IX THE CASES CITED BY YOUNG ARISE OUT OF THE
APPIICATTON OF UTAH INSURANCE LAW WHICH IS VERY
SIMILAR TO REAL ESTATE LAW.
Wardley criticizes and ridicules the authorities cited by Young in support of her arguments
in her appeal brie£ claiming that Young is attempting to rewrite the agreement between herself and
Wardley based upon authorities which do not deal directly with contract disputes between real estate
brokers and their agents. Wardley characterizes this as attempting to trump express covenants by
citing authorities that interpret entirely different cases and different contract language. By this
characterization of the issues and the cases, Wardley is attempting to skate by real estate law that
places the primary responsibility for collecting commissions upon the principal broker and places a
high contractual and agency duty on that broker to protect and secure commissions that the agents,
in this case Young, have earned by sweaty, tireless efforts and outstanding representation.
10

Wardley argues that the cases cited are about different contracts, the Agency listing agreement
between the seller and the broker and not the employment (agency) agreement between Wardley and
Young. Wardley either fails to recognize or chooses to ignore the fact that the listing agreement must
be read along with the Agreement between Wardley and Young to determine the amount of
commission to which both Wardley and Young were entitled. Fairbourne Commercial, Inc., v.
American Housing Partners, Inc., 68 P.3d 1038, 2003 UT App. 98 (Utah App. 2003); Robert
Langston, Ltd, v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 558 ( Utah App. 1987), Rehearing denied

These

cases held that a broker is entitled to a commission by producing a ready, willing and able purchaser,
whether or not the sale is consummated. This also applies to Young as an agent for a broker, in this
case Wardley, and is foundational to Young* s claim. If she is not entitled to the commission in the
first instance, (for finding a ready, willing and able buyer), she has no standing to claim against
Wardley for her share of the earned commission. IfWardley is entitled to a commission then Young
is also.
Furthermore, the holding that the broker does not guarantee payment of the commission by
a third party applies in this case. The agent, Young in this case, doesn't guarantee payment either.
Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc, 560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977) mdReedv. Union Cent Life
Ins. Co., 61 P. 21 (Utah 1900) hold that an employer or a contracting company cannot put receipt
of a commission beyond their reach voluntarily and escape liability for the payment ofthe commission
to the agent or employee. Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P. 2d 746, 750 (Utah 1983) is
a real estate case in which the buyer defaulted on a note to pay off the purchase price and the seller
stopped making payments to the broker. The Utah Supreme Court held that the broker nevertheless
was entitled to thefiillcommission. Young is in a very similar position here. There is a disputed issue
11

of fact in this case as to whether Wardley's failure to pursue collection of the unpaid portion of the
commission is just that, a voluntary relinquishment of the unpaid commission.
Abraham v. Walter Neller Company, 172 N. W. 2d 817 (Michigan 1969) while not
controlling is very persuasive. Its factual issues are identical or nearly identical to the instant case,
the Abraham case involved both the enforcement of a listing agreement and an agency agreement
with a sales agent. The Michigan Supreme Court construed a provision in the agency agreement
contract which provided for the payment of u[a] commission in accordance with the rate schedule
below, [I]mmediately afer the consummation of any sale as soon as such commission has been
collected by the broker." The broker took a listing agreement with one reservation and chose not to
charge or collect a commission. The Michigan Court held that the phrase, "immediately after the
consummation of any sale as soon as the commission has been collected by the broker"', specified the
time when the broker was required to pay the earned commission, but did not allow the broker to
deny the agent his earned commission by the broker's either failing to collect the commission or
accepting a listing agreement contrary to the agency contract.
While not controlling, the case is very much like the one at bar and the holding is very
applicable to the facts of this case. Wardley quips in its fact statement and in its argument that Young
did little or nothing to secure and protect the commissions at the time of closing. Young did all she
could do. She protested a reduction of the commissions to the buyer, the seller, the escrow agent and
her immediate broker, Kenneth Tramp, who was Wardley's branch broker over Young. Wardley,
on the other hand, who had the legal authority to commence an interpleader action and obtain a stay,
did nothing to stop the disbursement of the $166,000 to the seller and the buyer, and of which was
in violation of the Listing Agreement. Wardley's later suit against the seller was too little too late.
12

Wardley's failure to take action against the buyer and the escrow agent was contrary to the advice
and counsel of its own attorney, John Mangum, who wrote both the buyer and the title company and
placed them on notice that if Wardley did not recover the full amount of commissionfromthe seller
it would seek recovery from them. (AR 381-388) Wardley's attempt to place its burden and
responsibility on Young is bold, garish and disingenuous in light of the facts of this case.
The trial judge's construction and holding that Young's "earned commission" is governed by
the "as soon as practical afer collection" language in paragraph 8 ofthe Agreement and the "In House
Commission" provision on page 4 ofthe Agreement (AR 799-801) is in error and should be reversed.
Also, like the holding in WebBankv. American GeneralAnnuity Serv. Corp., Supra, 54 P.3d at 1144,
there is a genuine dispute as to a material issue of fact as to the nature and character of the contract
and transaction as well that precludes summary judgment. The case should be remanded to take
extrinsic evidence regarding the conduct of Wardley at the closing, and later in connection with its
failure to take action against the buyer and the escrow agent.
E.

THERE ARE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT
NEED TO BE ADJUDICATED.

Wardley argues that there are no disputed issues of material fact that need to be adjudicated.
To the contrary, that is what this appeal is all about. There are substantial disputed issues of material
fact that need to be adjudicated by the trial court, in addition to taking extrinsic evidence to resolve
ambiguities in the construction of the Agreement between Wardley and Young. Chief among the
disputed issues of fact is whether Wardley lived up to its duty under the Agreement to protect and
secure the payment of all of the earned commission in the sale and purchase transaction of the
Chateau. The Supreme Court in WebBank remanded the case back to the trial court to determine

13

from extrinsic evidence the intentions of the parties to the contract. It determined in that case that
because ofthe nature and character ofthe case, and the surrounding circumstances, that the contracts,
though facially unambiguous, were nevertheless ambiguous and required the taking ofparol evidence
to clear up the intentions of the parties.
The case at bar has similar characteristics. The trial court granted summary judgment based
upon what it described as the plain language of the contract. Presumably because the use of the
words or expressions "received" and "collected" are verbs and usually mean the possession of
something as being received or obtained, the trial judge felt that those words or expressions meant
that unless the commissions were received or collected, Wardley was under no obligation to pay
Young any part of the uncollected commission. However, this wholly overlooks two important
factors. First, when the words or expression are viewed in the context in which they were used, they
were not employed specifically to indicate receipt or collection. They were part of a provision of
expression used to describe how and when the commissions were to be apportioned and paid to
Wardley* s agent. Second, it completely overlooks the duties that Wardley has to Young as an agent.
It overlooks the roll that Wardley necessarily has as the principal broker in the transaction to collect
the commissions and not just passively sit by while the seller and the buyer, together with the escrow
agent, dissipate the sales proceeds that were designated in the closing documents (HUDs) as
commission to the broker. Young did her best to protest any reduction in the commissions and
disbursement to the parties. Wardley did not agree to any reduction, but only Wardley could take
legal steps to have the escrow agent interplead and thereby safeguard the funds. There is a serious
dispute in this case as to whether Wardley adequately discharged that duty and the matter needs to
be remanded to the trial court to take evidence on that issue; evidence that Young was precluded
14

from adducing at the trial because of the granting of Wardley's motion for summary judgment.
This issue also goes to the issue of whether Wardley violated a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing by its conduct or its failing to act. Where there is a contract there is always an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corporation, 94 P.3d 193,197198 (Utah 2004); see also SterlingB. Cannon v. Stevens School ofBusiness, 560 P.2d 1383,1385,
Supra, The trial judge on thefirstsummary judgment motion dismissed Young's claim for breach
of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, opining that under the language of the agreement,
Wardley did not have to do more. This Court should also reverse the granting of summary judgment
dismissing Young's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Wardley argues on pages 16 & 17 of its response brief that the arguments on pages 8 and 9
of Young's brief are not material because, 1) paragraphs 11 and 13 of the Agreement conferred on
Wardley the sole ownership of the listing and exclusive discretion to decide whether and to what
extent to pursue collection of any claimed commission, 2) Wardley undertook significant efforts to
collect the disputed commissionfromthe seller, and 3) Young failed to adduce any expert testimony
that Wardley's collection efforts were deficient.
Young acknowledges that Wardley was the sole owner of the listing agreement and had the
right to determine what efforts it would take to collect unpaid commissions.

However, these

provisions do not provide Wardley a waiver of responsibility for failing to discharge its duty as a
broker to safeguard and collect earned commissions onbehalf of the agents employed by it. Wardley
does not wish to discuss its failure to safeguard and protect the sales proceeds sufficient to collect
the full commissions while the funds were in escrow. Indeed, instead it attempts to put that burden
on Young's shoulders. Wardley did nothing except to refuse to agree to a reduction in the earned
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commission.
Wardley trumpets its suing the seller and obtaining a default judgment as significant efforts
to collect commission. In reality, all it did was have its attorney file a complaint and have it served
upon the seller. There was no other prosecution of the case except to file for and obtain a default
judgment when the seller failed to answer the complaint. Wardley had a lawfirmin California do an
asset search which revealed the seller had no net assets, which also revealed why the seller did not
answer Wardley* s complaint. This can hardly be described as significant efforts. In reality, it was too
little too late! Wardley did not pursue anything further against the seller and did not pursue litigation
against other culpable parties such as the buyer and the escrow agent, notwithstanding the advice of
its own attorney, John Mangum. Wardley had a clear case of interference with contractual relations
against the buyer who now had the Chateau property which he purchased for $7,900,000.00, less the
$75,000.00 he pilfered out of Wardley's commission along with the seller who absconded with
$91,000.00, because Wardley did nothing to stop them. Young was present at the buyer's closing
while he telephoned the sellerfromthe title company's office. Young heard the buyer, Gary Taylor,
tell the seller over the telephone that they could take the money out of Young's commission (AR
626). Taylor knew that Wardley had a contract with the seller as well as with him as the buyer,
because Young disclosed it in a limited agency agreement. He also knew the amount of the
commission Wardley was to receive because it was disclosed in the settlement documents (HUDs)
at his closing.
After such a shoddy attempt to collect the unpaid commissionfromthe seller after the closing,
Wardley has the unmitigated audacity to argue in its brief that Young failed to do anything at closing
to secure and safeguard the full commission. In fact, Young protested any change in Wardley's
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commission to the buyer, the seller and escrow agent, and immediately told Kenneth Tramp, her
supervisor and Wardley* s broker in the branch office where Young worked, that the seller and the
buyer were trying to make offwith some ofthe commission. (AR 626) Following the closing, Young
continued to query Tramp about what Wardley was doing until Wardley commenced the action
against the seller. Young also contacted Wardley* s attorney, John Mangum, and an attorney from
thefirmof Fabian Clendenin, Dan Anderson. Both Mangum and Anderson advised Wardley that it
had a cause of action against the escrow agent and the buyer, as well as one against the seller. (AR
639-646) It is clear from these pages, that it was not Wardley, but Young that was spurring the
collection efforts during and after the closing.
As for Wardley's snide argument that Young failed to adduce any expert testimony that it's
collection efforts did not meet some standard, this was a summary judgment motion or motions of
Wardley. The status and posture of the case did not call for Young to adduce expert testimony as
to the inadequacy of Wardley* s collection efforts. The letters of the two attorneys set forth above
were expert testimony as to what was available to Wardley. The court was obligated to construe
the evidence put forth in Young* favor and to draw all reasonable inferences therefrom. The court
could and should have drawn a reasonable inference that had it tried the issues at an evidentiary
hearing, Young could and would have adduced expert testimony to meet any such requirement.
V.

YOUNG HAS ESTABLISHED THROUGHOUT HER BRIEF
HOW THE AGENCY AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS, AS
WELL AS THE EXISTENCE OF DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT

Lastly, Wardley argues that Young'sfinalargument in her opening brief is fatally deficient,
because in that argument Young does not specify any phrase or word by which the Agreement is
conditionally ambiguous. Wardley's characterization is more poetic than accurate. Earlier in her brief,
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Young identified in detail the words and phrases which are ambiguous. They are the words and
phrases in the provisions which the Court construes to hold that Wardley is not obligated to pay a
commission unless it is received or collected (Opening brief, pp. 13-17). Young's final argument is
summary in nature and is supported by the arguments contained to that point in the opening brief.
VL CONCLUSION
The primary basis for this appeal is that Wardley did not discharge its duty under the contract
to collect or safeguard all of Young's earned commission on the sale of the Chateau Brickyard
Retirement Apartments. One would think that Wardley would have been oveijoyed at the closing of
such a substantial and lucrative purchase and sale, one in which Young located both the buyer and
the seller and worked tirelessly for many months before it was closed. However, be that as it may,
Young's opening brief and this reply explain in detail the error of the Court in construing words and
phrases according to their common meaning alone, and in contravention and out of the context in
which they were used.

Young's construction is both plausible and reasonable and takes into

consideration the sense and meaning they are given in the context in which they were used; to simply
describe how the commission was to be apportioned and when it was to be paid. The parties put
forth at least two plausible and reasonable interpretations.
There is considerable cogent information to establish a disputed issue of fact as to whether
Wardley discharged its duty to safeguard and collect the full earned commission in the Chateau sale.
This Court is required to construe the evidence submitted in the affidavits, depositions and other
discovery and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to Young as the opposing party. This
Court should reverse the two orders of summary judgment issued by the trial court and remand this
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action for trial to determine the intention andcgnduct of the partiesfromthe evidence.
Respectfully submitted this yf day of October:
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